Constitutional Criminal Procedure - Fourth Amendment - Search and Seizure - Electronic Surveillance - Pen Register by Weinstein, Michael P.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 18 Number 3 Article 14 
1980 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure - Fourth Amendment - Search 
and Seizure - Electronic Surveillance - Pen Register 
Michael P. Weinstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael P. Weinstein, Constitutional Criminal Procedure - Fourth Amendment - Search and Seizure - 
Electronic Surveillance - Pen Register, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 735 (1980). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol18/iss3/14 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - FOURTH AMENDMENT -
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE - PEN
REGISTER- The United States Supreme Court has held that the installation and
use of a pen register device is not a fourth amendment search requiring judicial
authorization.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
In March 1976, Michael Lee Smith was indicted in the Criminal
Court of Baltimore for robbery.1 Prior to trial, Smith filed a motion to
suppress all evidence that the prosecution had obtained through the in-
stallation and use of a pen register device The evidence obtained
from the surveillance device served as a basis for the indictment.
Smith contended that the fourth amendment3 required the police to ob-
tain a warrant based upon a showing of probable cause prior to the in-
stallation of the pen register device.'
1. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). Patricia McDonough, the victim of
the robbery, received telephone calls from the alleged robber. On one occasion, the caller
requested her to step out on her front porch. As she stood on her porch she saw an
automobile that she had earlier described to the authorities. The police traced the license
plate numbers and learned that the car was registered in the name of Michael Lee Smith.
Without obtaining a warrant, the police requested the telephone company to place a pen
register device at its central offices to record the numbers dialed on Mr. Smith's
telephone. The register revealed that he called the victim's number that same day. The
police then used this information to secure a warrant to search Mr. Smith's home, where
they found a page in his telephone book turned to the name and telephone number of the
victim. Id at 737.
2. Id A concise description of the function of a pen register device was given by
Justice Powell in his partial dissent in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), as follows:
A pen register is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line and
usually installed at a central telephone facility. It records on a paper tape all
numbers dialed from that line. It does not identify the telephone numbers from
which incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal whether any call, either incom-
ing or outgoing, was completed. Its use does not involve any monitoring of
telephone conversations.
See generally Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 108 (1970).
3. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searchesand seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Brief for Petitioner at 4. Smith conceded that the installation and use of a pen
register device was not subject to the requirements of Title III of ,the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
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The criminal court denied the motion to suppress, holding that
despite the absence of judicial authorization, the installation and use of
the pen register device did not violate the fourth amendment.' Smith
was subsequently convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.'
Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but prior to
the decision of that court, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a writ
of certiorari to determine if the evidence obtained from the pen
register was improperly admitted at trial.' The court affirmed Smith's
conviction, reasoning that a warrant was not required for the installa-
tion of a pen register.8 After granting certiorari9 to resolve a possible
conflict as to fourth amendment restrictions on the use of pen
registers," the United States Supreme Court held that because the in-
stallation and use of a pen register was not a.search, no warrant was
required.1
Speaking for the majority, Justice Blackmun cited Katz v. United
States" as controlling the fourth amendment issue." He established
that to invoke fourth amendment protection under Katz, the petitioner
would have to show that a justifiable expectation of privacy had been
invaded by government action. This requires the individual to prove
that he has a subjective expectation of privacy and that his subjective
expectation is one that society regards as reasonable.
Applying the Katz standard to the facts of Smith, the Court
dismissed the petitioner's contention that the state had infringed upon
5. 442 U.S. at 737-38.
6. Id. at 738.
7. Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858 (1978).
8. Id. at 160, 389 A.2d at 860.
9. 439 U.S. 1001 (1978).
10. Compare United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978) (use of pen register must comply with fourth
amendment) and In re an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or Similar
Mechanical Device, 538 F.2d 956, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) with Hodge v. Mountain States
Tel. and Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1977) (use of pen register not subject to re-
quirements of fourth amendment) and United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir.
1975).
11. 442 U.S. at 745-46. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined the majority opinion.
Justices Stewart and Marshall filed separate dissenting opinions in which Justice Brennan
joined. Justice Powell did not participate.
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained
evidence against the petitioner by placing an electronic eavesdropping device against the
outside of the public telephone booth being used by the petitioner. In reversing the peti-
tioner's conviction, the Supreme Court held that because the government's eavesdropping
activities intruded upon the justifiable privacy expectations of the petitioner, its activities
constituted a search requiring a warrant based upon probable cause. Id. at 351-53.
13. 442 U.S. at 739.
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his legitimate expectation of privacy. The majority noted that a pen
register, unlike the listening device employed in Katz, records only the
numbers dialed, but not the contents of the conversation." Thus, the
majority viewed the petitioner's claim as being that he had retained a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers he had dialed on his
phone. This claim was rejected because the Court believed that
telephone users do not generally entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial. 5 The Court reasoned that all
telephone subscribers knowingly convey phone numbers to the
telephone company; that users are aware of the telephone company's
capability to record this information; and that the company does record
this information for legitimate business purposes."6
After finding that there was no expectation of privacy by telephone
users in general, the Court addressed Smith's assertion that he had
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy by using the phone
in his house to the exclusion of others. This argument was also re-
jected by the majority. Justice Blackmun declared that whatever
relevance Smith's choice of location may have had regarding the con-
tents of the conversation, his choice could not have been calculated to
keep secret the numbers he dialed. Regardless of where the call was
initiated, Smith would have had to convey the number in exactly the
same manner. 8 The majority further reasoned that even if Smith did
have a subjective expectation of privacy when he dialed the phone
number, such an expectation is not recognized by society as
reasonable. Justice Blackmun reemphasized that there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information which a person voluntarily turns
over to third parties.' The majority determined that once the peti-
tioner voluntarily conveyed the number dialed to the telephone com-
pany, he assumed the risk that the company would divulge the infor-
mation to the police.' This was true even though the call at issue was
14. Id. at 741.
15. Id. at 742.
16. Id. The Court reasoned that the general public was aware of the telephone com-
pany's use of pen registers in situations where no warrant was required. This awareness
was said to be gleaned from the billing records of toll calls; the recording of calls subject
to a special rate structure; and from announcements in phone books offering help in the
event of obscene calls. See also Note, The Legal Constraints upon the Use of a Pen
Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028, 1029 n.11 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as The Legal Constraints].
17. 442 U.S. at 743.
18. Id. See also United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975) (fourth
amendment protects the content of the telephone conversation, but not the fact of a par-
ticular call being placed or a particular number being dialed).
19. 442 U.S. at 743-44.
20. Id. at 744. The Court analogized the facts in Smith to prior cases holding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily surrendered to
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local and automated in nature, and of the sort that telephone com-
panies do not normally record. To the majority, this was a mere fortu-
ity which did not make Smith's expectation legitimate. All that mat-
tered constitutionally was Smith's voluntary election to place the call
into the hands of a third party with the capability of recording it."
Thus, the Court concluded that even if the petitioner entertained an
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, his expectation
was not "legitimate." As a result, the use of the pen register was not a
search and no warrant was required.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart maintained that Katz
recognized the vital role played by the telephone in modern society.
This realization led the Court to give fourth amendment protection to
telephone conversations carried on by people at their home or office. 2
In his view, it made little sense to deny the same protection to the
number dialed because the digits were recorded for billing purposes by
the phone company. He maintained that the situs of the phone call had
constitutional significance since the captured information emanated
from private conduct within a protected area, the home.21 Justice
Stewart further contended that the numbers dialed were an integral
part of the telephone conversation and were therefore entitled to con-
stitutional protection under Katz.2'
In a separate dissent, Justice Marshall took issue with the
majority's finding that telephone subscribers have no expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial.' He questioned how the majority
could reasonably determine what inferences an individual drew from a
long distance billing on their phone bill, or whether the general public
even bothered to read cryptic references in phone books assuring help
in tracing phone calls.8 In his view, even if the general public was
third parties. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank depositor has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in negotiable instruments which he voluntarily sur-
rendered to the bank); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (accountant's disclosure
of records voluntarily given to him does not violate the fourth amendment); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (fourth amendment not violated when wired participant in
conversation transmits it to government agents); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966) (fourth amendment not violated where a trusted colleague turns out to be a govern-
ment informant); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (fourth amendment not
violated where a participant in conversation records it for government use).
21. 442 U.S. at 745.
22. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 747 (Stewart, J,, dissenting).
24. Id. at 747-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated: "Lacking the
Court's apparently exhaustive knowledge of this Nation's telephone books and the reading
habits of telephone subscribers . . . I decline to assume general public awareness of how
obscene phone calls are traced." Id. at 749 n.] (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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aware of the telephone companies' monitoring of phone calls for inter-
nal reasons, this did not mean that users expected the information to
be made available to the government. Justice Marshall reserved his
harshest criticism for the majority's finding that an expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed is unreasonable because the individual
had assumed the risk of disclosure to the government. He contended
that risk analysis in fourth amendment jurisprudence was limited to
those situations where the defendant had some discretion in deciding
who was to enjoy the confidential communication.27 In Smith, no discre-
tion existed since a phone subscriber had no realistic alternative to
dialing the phone number. Moreover, Marshall stated that risk analysis
allows the government to define the scope of reasonable privacy expec-
tations. This, he contended, was improper under Katz since the ques-
tion is not what risk an individual is presumed to accept when he con-
veys information to third parties, but rather what risk the individual
should be forced to accept in a free society." Justice Marshall main-
tained that if the individual's expectation of privacy in the phone
number dialed was to be abrogated at all, it should be for the limited
business purpose of the telephone company only and not to serve the
evidentiary needs of law enforcement.' Because the use of pen
registers had the potential for extensive intrusion into protected areas
of speech, political affiliation, and journalistic effort, he concluded that
the police should be required to secure a warrant for the telphone com-
pany's records."
Smith v. Maryland is the Court's most recent statement on the ex-
tent of fourth amendment protection from electronic surveillance
measures employed by the government. The early position of the
Supreme Court, enunciated in Olmstead v. United States,31 was that
27. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall maintained that "[p]rivacy is
not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain
facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that
this information will be released to other persons for other purposes." Id.
30. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the first wiretapping case to reach the Supreme
Court, the government obtained incriminating evidence against the accused and his
codefendants by electronically tapping a telephone wire. The Supreme Court viewed in-
tangibles, such as conversations, as being outside the scope of fourth amendment protec-
tion. In addition, because the surveillance did not involve a trespassory invasion, it was
not an unreasonable search and seizure. The Court held that neither obtaining evidence
by a wiretap nor using the evidence at trial violated the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Note, The Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy-Katz v. United States, a Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468, 469 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy].
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unauthorized electronic surveillance violated the fourth amendment
only if there was also a physical intrusion or penetration of the
premises from which the communication was made. In Silverman v.
United States," the Court extended this trespass doctrine by finding
that the fourth amendment was not predicated upon an actual physical
entry into the premises by the police.33 After Silverman, the actual
physical intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area," and not the
extent of an actual physical entry, was viewed as determinative by the
Court.
In Katz v. United States,3 the Supreme Court departed from the
physical trespass or intrusion analysis. The scope of the fourth amend-
ment was expanded to protect against any intrusion into an area in
which an individual harbored a "reasonable expectation of privacy.""
The Katz Court held that the electronic surveillance of an individual's
conversation required judicial authorization regardless of the absence
of any physical trespass, entry or intrusion." Following Katz, a
physical entry into the premises as in Olmstead, a physical intrusion of
the premises as in Silverman, or the surveillance of an oral conversa-
tion without any physical intrusion of the premises were all viewed as
an unconstitutional search if not effectuated pursuant to a valid search
warrant. The Katz decision recognized the need to safeguard the
privacy of the citizenry from the type of governmental invasions made
possible by the advent of electronic surveillance devices. Using such
devices, government can intrude into private lives in ways far beyond
the imagination of both the framers of the fourth amendment and the
Olmstead majority. 7 To prevent the erosion of fourth amendment
values by technological advances, the Katz majority realized' the
necessity to protect the individual's expectation that he could engage
in private conversation over the telephone.' In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Katz Court did not base its decision upon the form of the
evidence gathered by the electronic surveillance device, but rather
upon the privacy expectations of the individual and of society in
general. Consistent .with this view, it has been emphasized that while
32. 365 U.S. 505 (1960). In Silverman, the government inserted an electronic device
into a party wall so as to make contact with a heating duct going into the house. Without
deciding if a technical trespass had occurred, a unanimous Court held that the act con-
stituted an illegal search and seizure.
33. Id at 511.
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
35. 389 U.S. at 351. The Katz Court noted that the fourth amendment protects peo-
ple, not places, and expressly repudiated the physical trespass requirements. Id at 351-53.
36. Id at 353.
37. See The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, supra note 31, at 472.
38. 389 U.S. at 353.
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the monitoring of phone numbers may not be as substantively reveal-
ing as the conversation itself, it nonetheless reveals matters that one
legitimately desires to keep private. 9 The analysis of the Smith Court,
which focuses upon the nature of the surveillance device instead of
upon the purpose of the fourth amendment, is diametrically opposed to
the policy reasons underlying Katz.
Moreover, it is questionable whether privacy expectations can be
properly assessed by examining how the surveillance device works or
how widespread its use has become. In Smith, the majority made
broad statements about the general public's awareness of pen registers
that hardly rise to the level of an assumption.' Yet upon this basis,
and without any objective evidence that these assumptions are correct,
the Court decided that the public retains no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers they dial.41 Even if Smith did not, as the
majority maintained, harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy due to
the activities of the phone company and to so-called public awareness
of the use of pen registers, it is arguable that he reasonably enter-
tained a subjective expectation that his privacy would not be intruded
upon by the police, who are instruments of the state. 2 The use of the
pen register by the phone company in the normal course *of its
39. See 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
40. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
41. 442 U.S. at 742. To support the conclusion that the general public was aware of
the use of pen registers and similar devices, the majority relied upon such things as the
advertisements in the telephone book offering help in the event the customer was sub-
jected to obscene or threatening calls.
Examination of a typical telephone book reveals no specific mention of pen registers,
or even a general statement that the telephone company can detect the source of
troublesome calls. To find out how, if at all, the telephone company would combat such
calls requires the user to take the further step of calling the telephone company. A typical
telephone company advertisement would advise the recipient of annoyance calls as
follows:
Malicious, threatening and abusive calls, including those in which obscene or pro-
fane language is used, are prohibited. The making of such calls over the Company's
lines may constitute cause for disconnecting service and possible criminal prosecu-
tion, and civil action by the person called. The Telephone Company is concerned
about obscene and harassing calls and is trying to stop them. You don't have to talk
or listen to such calls-just hang up. If the calls persist, call your Service Represen-
tative at the Telephone Company Business Office. If a threat is made at any time,
also call the police.
Greater Pittsburgh Telephone Directory, White Pages 25 (Dec., 1979). If the user does call
the service representative, he could not be told that a pen register would be of any
assistance in tracing an obscene call, since the device is incapable of recording the
telephone number from which any particular incoming call originated. See note 2 supra. A
pen register would be useful only where the harassed party has a fair idea of the caller's
identity.
42. See 442 U.S. at 748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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business to determine if unauthorized long distance calls are being
made, or if a home phone is being used to conduct a business or to
make obscene phone calls, cannot be seen as negating a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy when-the surveillance stems from a government
request to investigate and to detect criminal activity unrelated to the
delivery of telephone service. 3 In such a case, the installation of the
pen register device is not done in the normal course of business."'
Another troubling aspect of the Smith decision is that it continues
the recent erosion of traditional fourth amendment protections sur-
rounding the home as well as conduct centered in the home. 5 In
evaluating fourth amendment claims, the Katz Court shifted the focus
of inquiry away from notions of a physical trespass to a standard that
protected the reasonable expectations of privacy of the individual sub-
ject to the surveillance." Although Katz expressly repudiated the
physical trespass requirement of Olmstead,'7 it did not redefine what
had always been a "constitutionally protected area,"" and thus did not
withdraw any protection the fourth amendment afforded to the home.
It is true that in Katz, the Court stated that the fourth amendment
"protects people, not places."'9 However, the Court subsequently ex-
plained in Alderman v. United States' that this statement was not to
be taken as withdrawing any protection from the home, nor as an in-
dication that the Silverman doctrine of constitutionally protected areas
was overruled." What Katz did hold is that a nonphysical intrusion in-
43. See Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 266-67 (9th Cir.
1977) (Hufstedler, J., concurring). In Commonwealth v. Dembo, 451 Pa. 1, 301 A.2d 689
(1973), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that because postal authorities were
authorized to open packages in the normal course of business to determine if the proper
rate was being charged, this practice did not mean that postal authorities could open
packages upon police request to find evidence of a crime.
44. See Comment, Pen Register Evidence With One-Party Consent: Should It Be Ad-
missible?, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 429, 431 (1971) (a pen register is not normally installed
for the purpose of detecting criminal activity) [hereinafter cited as Pen Register
Evidence].
45. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (separate judicial authorization not
required to make covert entry into home to install wiretap).
46. 389 U.S. at 350-53.
47. Id at 353.
48. The Court in Katz stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not
simply 'areas' " Id.
49. Id. at 351.
50. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
51. Id at 180. In the recent case of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, opined that a person subjected to a search and
seizure must show a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place" in order to
claim the protection of the fourth amendment. Id at 143. He stressed that "by focusing on
legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not
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to a place that is private can also constitute a violation of the fourth
amendment.52 A principled application of this standard to the home, an
admittedly private place, would dictate that acts short of physical in-
trusion may also be prohibited by the fourth amendment. The Katz
Court's statement that the fourth amendment protects people as op-
posed to places" necessarily requires reference to a place in order to
determine if the people gathered there have any justifiable privacy ex-
pectation." Thus, the rule has been stated that because the home is
largely a private place, it is of no constitutional significance that a
governmental intrusion is accomplished without resort to a physical
penetration of the premises.55
Because of these principles, it was necessary for the Court to deter-
mine if Smith's presence in his home entitled him to a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed. In finding his
location to be immaterial, the Court relied upon United States v.
Miller58 and other decisions holding that an individual who voluntarily
altogether abandoned the use of property concepts in determining the presence or
absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment." Id at 144 n.12. See also
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, supra note 31, at 479.
52. 389 U.S. at 351-53. See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the frequent-
ly cited companion case to Katz, in which the Court maintained that "[tihe purpose of the
probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, [is] to keep the state out of con-
stitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been
or is being committed." Id. at 59.
53. 389 U.S. at 351.
54. Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. Id at 353.
56. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The Miller Court held that:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the infor-
mation will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of informa-
tion revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
Id at 443 (citation omitted).
In response to Miller, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Regulatory and In-
terest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978). In Title XI of
that statute, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. II
1978), Congress limited procedures whereby federal authorities could obtain a customer's
bank records, id § 3402, as well as granted to the customer the opportunity to challenge
the legitimacy of any seizure, id § 3410. The purpose of Title XI is to protect the
customers of financial institutions from unwarranted intrusions into their private records
while at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement activity. Title XI seeks to
strike a balance between the customer's right to privacy and the need of law enforcement
agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate investigations.
Some state courts have circumvented Miller by finding that a depositor retains a
legitimate expectation of privacy in banking records as a matter of state constitutional
law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979); Burrows v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, (1974).
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conveys information to third parties assumes the risk that the informa-
tion will be turned over to the authorities.57 In the majority's opinion,
Smith's conduct could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy
of the numbers he dialed, since the numbers would be conveyed in ex-
actly the same manner regardless of his location.58 This analysis is
flawed in several respects. First, if this reasoning is accepted, there is
no basis to protect the ensuing conversation, since it also passes
through telephone company equipment in order to be processed to the
receiver of the dialogue. 59 This is equally true whether the call initiates
in the home as in Smith, or in a public phone booth as in Katz. Just as
the individual cannot find a secure method to dial the numbers, there
is no secure line for the conversation once the number is dialed.
Secondly, there can be no true assumption of the risk if there are no
alternatives to assuming the risk."0 There is no alternative to using a
telephone if one is to take part in the social, economic, and political life
of the country. Neither the petitioner nor anyone else can be said to
"voluntarily" use the telephone without ignoring the vital role of the
telephone in modern society. This was clearly recognized in Katz.61
Furthermore, even if one does voluntarily surrender the numbers
he dials to the telephone company, it does not follow that all expecta-
tions of privacy in the information become illegitimate. Even before
Katz, fourth amendment protection extended to situations which were
not absolutely private. 2 Katz did not overrule this principle, nor did it
postulate a rule of absolute secrecy before one could claim a
reasonable expectation of privacy. As such it can hardly be said that
the telephone user is subject to unrestrained police scrutiny merely
because he has surrendered a portion of his privacy for a limited pur-
pose to those with whom he is doing business. 3 It is not unreasonable
57. 442 U.S. at 743-44.
58. See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
59. 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60. 1I at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th
ed. 1971).
61. The Katz Court acknowledged that even public telephones played a vital role in
private communication. 389 U.S. at 352. Smith breeds a curious dichotomy into the law of
electronic surveillance, since the user of a public phone booth is deemed to have selected
the site for privacy reasons, yet the user of a private phone is said to be incapable of dial-
ing the number in privacy. 442 U.S. at 743.
62. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (because maids, janitors and
repairmen may enter hotel rooms to perform their duties does not mean the room is not
protected by the fourth amendment against an invasion by the police); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (because a landlord may enter his tenants' dwelling does not
mean that the police may do so with the permission of the landlord).




to expect that the number conveyed to the telephone company will be
used solely to process the call.
Assuming that risk analysis is the proper method to adjudicate cer-
tain fourth amendment claims, it is somewhat incongruous to treat the
telephone company as an ordinary third party," and not as a govern-
ment sanctioned monopoly. Although the Court assumed state action
to be present in Smith,"5 it failed to recognize that the state, through
licensing power, will always dictate to whom a telephone user must
initially convey the signal."' The individual has no choice between com-
peting alternatives unless the alternatives are viewed as using or not
using the phone at all. By granting a telephone company a virtual if
not absolute monopoly in an essential area of communication,"7 the
state can, consistent with the Smith Court's analysis, effectively force
the telephone user to accept the risk of disclosure. While Katz
recognized that foregoing the use of the telephone is not a realistic
alternative in modern society, Smith gives the individual no other
choice but to assume the risk of unrestrained government monitoring.
The Smith Court's approval of the installation of pen registers
without judicial authorization does little to prevent the unrestrained6
64. See 442 U.S. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 739 n.4.
66. For example, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1103(a) (Purdons Supp. 1979) provides that: "[a] certificate of public convenience shall be
granted by order of the [State public utility] commission, only if the commission shall find
or determine that the granting of such certificate is necessary or proper for the service,
accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public." (emphasis added).
In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942), the Supreme Court recognized that certain
state action was immune from the anti-monopoly proscriptions of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). In Mobilphone of Northeastern Pa. v. Commonwealth Tel. Co., 571
F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the Parker ex-
emption to the state's control over the radio-telephone paging market. In Mobilphone, the
state controlled entry into the market by using the certificate of public convenience. This
was said to be evidence of such complete and active control, as required by Parker, so as
to give rise to the state action exemption from the Sherman Act. Just as the presence of
state licensing is seen as sufficient to give rise to an antitrust exemption, so also should
state action with respect to the licensing of a monopolistic public utility be seen as effec-
tively dictating to the telephone subscriber acceptance of the risk of disclosure of the
numbers he dials on his telephone.
67. The telephone company's unique status as a monopoly led the Sixth Circuit, in
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977), to affirm an
order requiring the telephone company to install equipment and perform certain opera-
tions to aid the Federal Bureau of Investigation in tracing telephone calls.
68. Under Smith, the police may without any cause whatsoever and for whatever
purpose they choose, uncover private relationships. If the police desired to obtain a pat-
tern of contacts and associations of a group of individuals there would be nothing to stop
them from placing pen registers on the lines of individuals who have received calls from a
phone already subject to pen register surveillance. This is true even though the number
dialed from the monitored phone may have been dialed mistakenly.
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and indiscriminate 9 use of the device by law enforcement authorities.
The unsupervised use of pen registers could result in a "chilling effect"
on freedom of association.0 Throughout history the first and fourth
amendments have been inseparably tied7' and just as the widespread
use of a wiretap device can affect an individual's right to free speech,
the widespread use of the pen register device can affect an individual's
right to free association.7 It is all too easy to dismiss the pen register
as a harmless device simply because it does not intercept the contents
of the conversation.
7 3
The Court's unwillingness to subject governmental use of pen
registers to the requirements of the warrant clause must be analyzed
in terms of the conflicting interests of the parties before the Court. In
Smith, the interests to be balanced are the desire to eliminate inva-
69. Allowing the interception of all numbers dialed resembles the "general warrant"
feared by the framers of the fourth amendment. That is why the amendment calls for a
particular description of the items subject to the search and seizure. See Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480-81 (1965). Accordingly, if
the telephone number subject to interception begins with 642, it would be unnecessary to
record a number beginning with 562, yet the pen register records even those numbers.
See Pen Register Evidence, supra note 44, at 432. Even if the caller has no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, surely the unwilling recipient of a call has a reasonable expectation
that his number is not being documented by the telephone company or the authorities,
especially when he does not answer his phone, yet again the pen register records those
numbers.
70. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice Douglas found first amend-
ment issues inseparable from fourth amendment issues and argued that prior judicial
authorization should be obtained before any electronic surveillance occurs. He maintained
that "[m]onitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.
Free discourse-a First Amendment value-may be frivolous or serious, humble or de-
fiant, reactionary or revolutionary, profane or in good taste; but it is not free if there is
surveillance." Id at 762 (Douglas, J., dissenting). As Professor Amsterdam argues, "[tihe
insidious, far-reaching and indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance- and, most im-
portant, its capacity to choke off free human discourse that is the hallmark of an open
society-makes it almost, although not quite, as destructive of liberty, as 'the kicked-in
door.' " Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388
(1974).
71. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. See Pen Register Evidence, supra note 44, at 433. One commentator suggests
that if pen register data were fed into a central computer on a widespread basis, patterns
of acquaintances and dealings among a substantial group of people would be available to
the government. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 43 (1971).
73. A pen register may be subject to abuse because it may be easily converted into a
wiretap by attaching headphones or a tape recorder to appropriate terminals on the pen
register unit. Newer models of pen registers have automatic voice activated switches
which can automatically turn a tape on and off as the telephone is used. See Circumven-




sions of privacy of innocent citizens against the desire of law enforce-
ment authorities to employ techniques like the pen register to detect
and combat increasingly sophisticated lawbreakers." In Katz, the
Court balanced these two interests by subjecting the electronic
surveillance at issue there to the requirement of the warrant clause.7"
The underlying goal in Katz was to maximize individual freedom while
at the same time permitting the authorities to use an effective law en-
forcement tool."6 The majority in Smith, however, did not strive to
balance the individual's right to privacy and the needs of law enforce-
ment. By treating the needs of law enforcement as paramount, the
Court has sanctioned the prospect of abusive and overzealous activity
by government agents.77
Michael P. Weinstein
74. See id. at 751.
75. See The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, supra note 31, at 484.
76. Id.
77. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), as in Katz, the Court recognized the
threat electronic surveillance posed to an individual's privacy and maintained that:
[W]e cannot forgive the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law
enforcement. . . . While '[tihe requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not in-
flexible . . . to the legitimate needs of law enforcement,' it is not asking too much
that officers be required to comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amend-
ment .... Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the
use of eavesdropping devices.
Id. at 62-63 (citation omitted).
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